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I. JURISDICTION
This appeal is brought pursuant to the provisions of Article
VIII, Sections 3 and 5 of the Constitution of Utah and Rules 3, 4
and 42 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
II. NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW
SMP, Inc., appeals from the Fourth Judicial District Court's
entry of Summary Judgment in favor of AJ Industries, Inc., and
Reyco Industries, Inc., on October 6, 1989.
III. STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Whether SMP waived the following issues by raising them

for the first time on appeal:
a.

SMP was denied due process because of inadequate
notice;

b.

Summary judgment should not have been entered before
SMP concluded discovery;

c.

The installation instructions AJ/Reyco provided Thayco
were inadequate.

2.

Whether SMP was denied due process based on the trial

court's notice of hearing.
3.

Whether the trial court properly entered summary

judgment for Respondents.
IV. DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITIES
Constitutional Provisions:
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty
or property, without due process of law.
Constitution of Utah, Article I, Section 7.

Rules:
Rule 56. Summary Judgment.
(b) For defending party. A party against whom a claim,
counterclaim, or cross-claim is asserted or a
declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any time, move
with or without supporting affidavits for a summary
judgment in his favor as to all or any part thereof.
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion shall
be served at least 10 days before the time fixed for
the hearing. The adverse party prior to the day of
hearing may serve opposing affidavits. The judgment
sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions
on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show
that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact
and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as
a matter of law. . . .
Rule 56 (b) and (c), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
Rule 24. Briefs.
(a) Brief of Appellant. The brief of the appellant
shall contain under appropriate headings and in the
order indicated: . . .
(7) A statement of the case. The statement shall
first indicate briefly the nature of the case, the
course of proceedings, and its disposition in the
court below. A statement of the facts relevant to
the issues presented for review shall follow. All
statements of fact and references to the
proceedings below shall be supported by citations
to the record . . . .
Rule 24(a)(7), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
V. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature Of The Case.
Plaintiff/Appellant SMP, Inc. ("SMP"), a trucking concern,

purchased trailers from Defendant Fleet Sales and Leasing Company
("Fleet") in 1985.

The trailers were manufactured by Defendant

Thayco Manufacturing, Inc. ("Thayco"), and contained component
2

parts—heavyweight suspension systems—manufactured and supplied
to Thayco by Defendant/Respondent Reyco Industries, Inc., a
wholly owned subsidiary of Defendant/Respondent AJ Industries,
Inc. (collectively referred to as "AJ/Reyco").

SMP sued the

above-referenced defendants, and others, alleging under several
theories loss of income and property damage due to poor quality
of the trailers.
B.

Course Of Proceedings And Disposition Below.
SMP filed its Complaint on September 25, 1987.

10.)

(R. at 1-

After significant discovery and opportunity for discovery

(R. at 18, 19, 37, 38, 50, 53, 58, 60, 62, 64, 66, 68, 69, 73,
75, 77, 79, 81, 82, 84, 87, 90, 93 and 95), on May 31, 1989,
AJ/Reyco filed a Motion for Summary Judgment as to all of SMP's
claims against them, on grounds that no evidence existed to show
AJ/Reyco breached a legal duty or any of their conduct
proximately caused SMPfs injury.

(R. at 112-22.)

On June 19,

1990, SMP filed a Memorandum in Opposition to the Motion for
Summary Judgment (R. 123-27), and later filed an opposing
Affidavit (R. at 134-37), and AJ/Reyco filed a Reply Memorandum
in Support of the Motion for Summary Judgment.

(R. at 152-64.)

The Record is devoid of a Motion or Rule 56(f) Affidavit by SMP
seeking additional time in which to conduct discovery and/or
respond to the Motion for Summary Judgment, or an objection
asking the Court not to rule upon the merits of the fully-briefed
Motion for Summary Judgment.

In fact, SMP requested oral

argument of AJ/Reycofs Motion for Summary Judgment against it.
(R. at 133.)
Based upon SMP's request for oral argument, the Court sent
counsel a notice of hearing, but inadvertently stated therein
that AJ/Reycofs Ex Parte Application to File Overlength Reply
Memorandum would be heard.

(R. at 201.)

Counsel for SMP

appeared at the hearing and opposed and argued against the Motion
for Summary Judgment.

(R. at 202; Addendum A.)

The Record lacks

any objection to the notice, the hearing, or the Court ruling on
the merits of the Motion for Summary Judgment.

The Record is

devoid of any reference to SMP seeking additional time in which
to conduct discovery and/or respond to the Motion for Summary
Judgment.
In a Ruling dated September 14, 1989, Judge Cullen Y.
Christensen found no genuine issue of material fact with respect
to SMP's claims against AJ/Reyco and ruled that AJ/Reyco were
entitled to summary relief.

(R. at 203-08; Addendum B.)

AJ/Reyco filed a proposed form of Order of Summary Judgment to
which SMP objected.

The sole bases of the Objection were that

(1) AJ/Reyco should not be entitled to costs, and (2) the Judge's
Ruling had not stated that the matter should be "dismissed on the
merits with prejudice.11

(R. at 211.)

On October 6, 1989, the

trial court entered the Order of Summary Judgment, overruling
SMP!s two objections.

(R. at 216-18; Addenda C, D.)

On October 31, 1989, SMP filed a Notice of Appeal from the
Court's Order of Summary Judgment.

(R. at 225.)

The Utah

Supreme Court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction based
on the pendency of SMPfs claims against other defendants and
SMP's failure to have the Order of Summary Judgment certified as
a final Order.

(R. at 239.)

On March 9, 1990, the District

Court certified the Order of Summary Judgment as final under Rule
54(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

(R. at 245.)

SMP filed a

Notice of Appeal on March 26, 1990 (R. at 251), and a Certificate
of Transcript on March 26, 1990.

(R. at 249.)

The Certificate

of Transcript states that, "Plaintiff/Appellant, SMP, Inc. has
not requested a transcript of the Summary Judgment Hearing in
regard to this matter and further certifies that same is not
required by Plaintiff/Appellant on Appeal."
C.

(R. at 249.)

Statement Of Facts And Citations To The Record.
Plaintiff SMP is a Pennsylvania corporation and is doing

business as an authorized motor carrier in Utah County, State of
Utah.

(R. at 1.)

In March of 1985 and thereafter, SMP purchased

from Defendant Fleet 77 new 1985 flatbed trailers for use in
SMP's business.

(R. at 1.)

The 77 trailers were manufactured by

Defendant Thayco in its South Hill, Virginia plant.
(Thayer, pp. 14, 26).)

(R. at 256

No evidence exists in the Record to show

that Respondents AJ/Reyco designed, manufactured, distributed or
sold the trailers in question.
In 1984 Thayco purchased the South Hill plant from a Watkins
Manufacturing ("Watkins").

Thereafter, Thayco adopted and

incorporated Watkins1 design and plans for the manufacture of
Thayco flatbed trailers, including the 77 trailers eventually
5

sold to SMP.

Thayco made no changes in the design,

(R. at 255

(Crough, pp. 20-24, 26-28, 31-32).)
Lynn Docherty was the purchasing agent for Thayco and was
responsible for purchasing the component parts for the flatbed
trailers at the South Hill, Virginia plant.
(Docherty, p. 7); R. at 255 (Crough, p. 98).)

(R. at 257
James F. Crough

worked for Thayco in South Hill, Virginia beginning 1984 when
Thayco purchased the plant from Watkins.
20).)

(R. at 255 (Crough, p.

Mr. Crough was in charge of the manufacture and assembly

of trailers at the time when Thayco manufactured the trailers
that SMP eventually purchased.

(R. at 255 (Crough, pp. 20-24);

R. at 257 (Docherty, pp. 7).)
Defendant/Respondent Reyco, a wholly owned subsidiary of
Defendant/Respondent AJ, manufactured and supplied to Thayco
component parts—heavyweight suspension assemblies—for certain
of the Thayco flatbed trailers that eventually were sold to SMP.
(R. at 255 (Crough, pp. 51-53, 99-101); R. at 257 (Docherty, pp.
6-11, 16-17).)

Reyco supplied to Thayco, by and through Mr.

Docherty, the installation instructions and drawings for the
Reyco heavyweight suspension assemblies.
pp. 9-11, 38).)

(R. at 257 (Docherty,

The Reyco instructions and drawings for the

suspension assemblies instructed the assembler to use a middle
hanger cross pipe brace in the installation.

(R. at 257

(Docherty, pp. 9-11, 38, and Exhibit 16 thereto).)
Thayco installed the Reyco heavy-weight suspension systems
in the flatbed trailers using instead the Watkins instructions

and drawings.

(R. at 255 (Crough, p. 32).)

Thayco installed the

heavyweight suspension systems without incorporating a middle
hanger cross pipe brace because (1) the Watkins design and
instructions did not call for the brace and (2) a Thayco engineer
had told Messrs. Crough and Docherty that such braces were
unnecessary.

(R. at 255 (Crough, pp. 32, 51-53, 64, 82, 84, 99,

101, 131); R. at 257 (Docherty, pp. 9-11, 1(5-19, 25, 28-29, 38,
40, 45).)

Mr. Crough admitted in his deposition that he had

received the Reyco installation instructions when he began
assembling the heavyweight suspensions but that he did not follow
those instructions. (R. at 255 (Crough, p. 101).)x
In fact, Thaycofs purchasing agent, Mr. Docherty, did not
discuss the installation of the Reyco suspension systems with Mr.
Crough because he assumed that Mr. Crough was familiar with the
correct procedures for installation of such suspension systems.
(R. at 257 (Docherty, pp. 16, 29).)

Mr. Docherty never discussed

with Mr. Crough the fact that the Reyco instructions and drawings
specified the installation of the cross pipe brace for the Reyco
suspension assemblies.

(R. at 257 (Docherty, pp. 29, 40).) Mr.

Docherty, who was not the one who provided the instructions to
Mr. Crough, assumed that Mr. Crough had cross pipe bracing

a

SMP asserts on appeal that although AJ/Reyco supplied the
installation instructions to Thaycofs purchasing agent, Mr.
Docherty, AJ/Reyco did not take steps to assure that the actual
installer, Mr. Crough, received the instructions. The assertion
overlooks Mr. Croughfs admission that he, in fact, had received
the instructions when he began assembling the suspensions. See
infra footnote 12.
7

available to him in South Hill, Virginia.
pp. 40).)

(R. at 257 (Docherty,

The cross pipe bracing could be purchased locally at

South Hill, Virginia, at less expense to Thayco than by
purchasing it from Reyco, as needed for the Thayco trailer
specifications.

(R. at 255 (Crough, pp. 143-44).)

Thayco never provided Reyco drawings of how it would install
the suspension assemblies and of the particular design of the
Thayco trailers; Reyco was unaware of the size of the cross pipe
needed for installation of the suspension assemblies in the
Thayco trailers.

(R. at 255 (Crough, p. 144).)

On two

occasions, Bob Wells, an employee of Reyco, visited the Thayco
facility in South Hill, Virginia and met with Mr. Crough. Mr.
Crough could not testify whether Mr. Wells even observed any of
the Thayco trailers, and he could not recall what he and Mr.
Wells had looked at. All deliveries of trailers were made to SMP
before the second visit.

(R. at 255 (Crough, pp. 49, 103).)

Plaintiff alleged that from the spring of 1985 to the date
of filing the lawsuit and beyond, the Thayco flatbed trailers
malfunctioned and failed to perform because the steel in the
frames and slider frames cracked, rendering the trailers in
violation of safety standards.

(R. at 1.)

SMP alleged property

damage, business damage, and other damage arising out of the
design, manufacture and sale of the trailers.

(R. at 1.)

SMP

also alleged that the trailers were defective and unreasonably
dangerous.

Based on its factual allegations, SMP alleged five

causes of action as against all defendants, including AJ/Reyco.
(R. at 1.)
The Record lacks any facts tending to show (1) that the
heavyweight suspensions were defective in any way, or (2) that
the cracking in the steel frames and slider frames was the
proximate result of any manufacturing, design or instruction
defect(s) in the heavyweight suspensions.

In addition, Appellant

SMP has admitted that had Thayco followed the Reyco instructions
for installation of the suspension systems, and included cross
pipes, the cracking would not have occurred.

(R. at 125, P 10.)

However, no evidence in the Record suggests that the absence of
cross pipe bracing was a proximate cause of the injury.2
Based upon the state of the Record, as set forth above, and
SMP!s failure to controvert any material facts (see R. at 12325), Judge Cullen Y. Christensen granted AJ/Reyco's Motion for
Summary Judgment.

(R. at 203-08, 217-18; Addenda B,D.)

AJ/Reyco

incorporate by this reference B. Course Of Proceedings And
Disposition Below, supra, as though fully set forth herein,

2

AJ/Reyco do not admit that the cracking in the steel
occurred because Thayco failed to install the cross pipe brace.
AJ/Reyco contend that the cracking in the steel frames and slider
frames would have occurred with £r without the cross pipe brace,
because of the poor quality of Thaycofs trailers, and therefore
the component part suspension assemblies had no connection to
SMPfs alleged injury. However, even if the Court assumes that
the absence of cross pipe bracing was a factor in the cracking of
the trailers, which is unsupported by the Record, it does not
affect the merits of the Motion for Summary Judgment because
Reyco gave installation instructions which included the cross
pipe bracing.
9

because those facts bear directly on the merits of issues SMP
raises for the first time on appeal.
In addition, SMPfs Brief sets forth no citations to the
Record on Appeal as support for the conclusory allegations in its
Statement of Facts.

(Appellant's Brief at 2-3.)
VI. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

SMP raised several issues for the first time on appeal and
therefore waived those issues.

They include (1) the assertion

that SMP?s due process rights were violated based on the trial
courtfs notice of hearing; (2) the claim that the Order of
Summary Judgment was entered before SMP could complete discovery;
and (3) the claim that AJ/Reycofs instructions were inadequate.
In addition, SMP makes several factual claims in its
Statement of Facts and throughout its Argument.

None of those

claims are supported by or cited to the Record.

For that reason,

this Court should assume the correctness of the trial courtfs
ruling on the Summary Judgment Motion.
SMPfs due process rights were not violated or deprived
because SMP had full and fair opportunity to present its
objections and opposition to the Motion for Summary Judgment,
both in writing and orally.
SMP!s case against AJ/Reyco is based in speculation and
conjecture, clearly insufficient alternatives to proof under Utah
law.

No facts in the record establish the essential elements of

SMP's claims, including fault and proximate cause.
rest entirely on conclusory allegations.

SMPfs claims

Finally, AJ/Reyco supplied proper installation instructions
to SMP, which SMP chose not to follow.

The law does not impose a

duty on a component-part supplier to make certain that the
manufacturer installs the part according to the installation
instructions.

AJ/Reyco exhausted their duty by providing Thayco

the instructions.
VII. ARGUMENT
POINT I
SMP WAIVED THE ISSUES IT RAISES
FOR THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL
The Utah Supreme Court has forcefully and consistently held
that an appeals court will not consider issues raised before it
for the first time.

Sorenson v. Larsen, 740 P.2d 1336 (Utah

1987); Topik v. Thurber, 739 P.2d 1101, 1103

Utah 1987); Insley

Mfg. Corp. v. Draper Bank & Trust, 717 P.2d 1341, 1347 (Utah
1986).

In Franklin Financial v. New Empire Dev. Co., 659 P.2d

1040, 1045 (Utah 1983), the Court stated that the record must
clearly show that an issue was "timely presented to the trial
court in a manner sufficient to obtain a ruling thereon; we
cannot assume that it was properly raised."

If a party fails to

present an issue to the trial court, it will have "waived the
right to raise it" on appeal.
83, 85 (Utah 1983).

Utah County v. Brouwn, 672 P.2d

"It is axiomatic that defenses and claims

not raised by the parties in the trial [court] cannot be
considered for the first time on appeal."
663 P.2d 100, 102 (Utah 1983).
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Bangerter v. Poulton,

Because SMP did not raise the following issues at the trial
court level, those issues are waived and should not be considered
by this Court:
A.

Due Process Violation Based On Claimed Inadequate Notice.
SMP claims that the trial courtfs notice of hearing was

inadequate to apprise SMP of the true nature of the hearing and
that SMP!s due process rights were therefore violated.

The

Record contains no citation or reference to any objection by SMP
or its attorney that the notice was inadequate, that SMP desired
more time to prepare for oral argument or that SMP was unprepared
to proceed at the hearing.

Because SMP raises this issue for the

first time on appeal, the issue is waived.3
B.

Granting Summary Judgment Before Plaintiff Had Opportunity
To Conduct Its Discovery.
SMP claims that it had further discovery to conduct before a

hearing and ruling on the Motion for Summary Judgment was
appropriate.

The Record contains SMPfs Memorandum in Opposition

to the Motion for Summary Judgment and an accompanying Affidavit,
which do not raise that issue.

The Record does not contain a

Rule 56(f) Affidavit asking for more time in which to conduct
discovery or otherwise asking for more time to respond to the
Motion for Summary Judgment.

Ironically, the Record also

contains SMP!s Request for Oral Argument on the Motion for

3

The claim of denial of due process also fails on the merits
for the reasons set forth in POINT III, infra.

Summary Judgment.

Because SMP raises this argument for the first

time on appeal, it is waived,*
C.

Reyco's Installation Instructions To Thayco Were Inadequate.
In unsupported and conclusory allegations, SMP contends that

Reycofs instructions to Thayco were inadequate.

SMP made no such

allegation at the trial court level in response to the Motion for
Summary Judgment and it is therefore waived.5
POINT II
THIS COURT SHOULD ASSUME THE CORRECTNESS
OF THE JUDGMENT BELOW
The Utah Supreme Court has consistently held that it will
assume the correctness of the judgment below where, as here, an
appellant does not support the facts set forth in its brief with
citations to the Record.

Trees v. Lewis, 738 P.2d 612, 613 (Utah

1987); State v. Tucker, 657 P.2d 755, 756-57 (Utah 1982).

In

Trees, the Court stated that it
will assume the correctness of the judgment below where
counsel on appeal does not comply with the requirements
*SMP cites Auerbach's Inc. v. Kimball, 572 P.2d 376 (Utah
1977) as support that the Motion for Summary Judgment should not
have been granted because SMPfs discovery was not complete. In
Auerbach1s, Kimball had discovery requests outstanding at the
time the Court entered Summary Judgment against Kimball, and over
Kimball's specific objection. Kimball sought additional time
because the outstanding discovery, he claimed, specifically
addressed the issues on summary judgment. The Supreme Court
reversed, stating that the Motion should have been continued
until Kimball completed the discovery he thought necessary.
In this case, SMP had no discovery outstanding, had
conducted deposition discovery, and did not ask the Court to
continue the Motion for Summary Judgment for any purpose.
5

The allegation fails for the additional reasons set forth
in POINT V, infra.
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of Rule 75(p)(2)(2)(d), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,
as to making a concise statement of facts and citation
of the pages in the record where they are supported,6
738 P.2d at 613. (Citations omitted.)

Similarly, in State v.

Tucker, the Court concluded that:
A separate and independent basis for the affirmance of
the trial court is that the defendant failed to refer
to any portion of the record that factually supports
his contentions on appeal.
657 P.2d at 756-57.
In support of its argument that a genuine fact question
exists and that summary judgment was improper, Appellant SMP sets
forth factual assertions on pages 2-3 of its Brief,

SMP also

makes various factual assertions throughout its argument which
find no support in the Record and are not cited to the Record.7
The assertions are conclusory, unsupported and insupportable by
the Record.

For that reason, this Court should assume the

6

Rule 24(a)(7), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure,
ultimately replaced former Utah Rule of Civil Procedure
75(p)(2)(2)(d), but did not alter the requirement that appellant
cite specifically to the record to support the fact statements
and assertions in the brief. See Trees, 738 P.2d at 613, n.3
(replaced by Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 24(a)(6), effective
January 1985).
7

For example, on page 9 of its Brief, SMP states:

Reyco and AJ take several positions which do not agree
with the facts as alleged by SMP. For example, they
argue that they are mere suppliers who had no part in
selecting the products. SMP has alleged otherwise.
(Emphasis supplied.) SMP raises other such purported fact issues
throughout its Argument. Two problems exist with SMP!s
contentions. First, no reference is made to the Record.
And
second, SMP assumes it can raise genuine issues of material fact
with mere allegations.

correctness of the trial court's entry of judgment below for
AJ/Reyco.
POINT III
SMP WAS NOT DEPRIVED OF DUE PROCESS
The question under a procedural due process analysis is
whether a party, under the particular circumstances of its case,
has a fair opportunity to oppose or present objections to
adversarial conduct that would impair a constitutionally
protected interest.

Kinger v. Kepano, 635 P.2d 938, 942 (Hawaii

1981); Ranum v. Colorado Real Estate Comm!n, 713 P.2d 418, 419
(Colo. App. 1985).

What is fair is not based on an established

or universal standard of conduct but rather depends on the
circumstances of the particular case.

See, e.g., McMillan v.

Anchorage Community Hosp., 646 P.2d 857 (Alaska 1982); Aspen
Airways, Inc. v. Rocky Mountain Airways, Inc., 196 Colo. 285, 584
P.2d 629 (1978); Bowler v. Board of Trustees of School Dist. No.
392, 101 Idaho 537, 617 P.2d 841 (1980); United Nuclear Corp. v.
General Atomic Co., 93 N.M. 105, 597 P.2d 290, cert, denied, 444
U.S. 911 (1979); Munoz v. Machner, 590 P.2d 1352 (Wyo. 1979).
the Utah Supreme Court stated:
"Due process" is not a technical concept that can be
reduced to a formula with a fixed content unrelated to
time, place, and circumstances. Rather, "the demands
of due process rest on the concept of basic fairness of
procedure and demand a procedure appropriate to the
case and just to the parties involved."
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As

Nelson v. Jacobsen, 669 P.2d 1207, 1213 (Utah 1983)8 (quoting
Rupp v. Grantsville City, 610 P.2d 338, 341 (Utah 1980)).

A

determination of "when the process demands are met requires a

e

SMP cites Nelson v. Jacobsen, 669 P.2d 1207 (Utah 1983), an
alienation of affection case, as support that SMP was denied due
process based on inadequate notice. SMP misstates the critical
distinguishing factor in Nelson by stating that the notice went
to "counsel." In fact, defendant was a non-lawyer who
represented himself in the trial after having two days notice
before the trial began. Justice Oaks' opinion addresses the
fairness of the notice and emphasizes that a fair "opportunity to
present . . . objections" is the critical ingredient of due
process that was missing. He emphasized the inexperience of a
lay person in this situation as bearing on the question of
fairness:
To a member of the bar or even to a layperson
experienced with trial proceedings, setting a case for
"hearing" could have been understood as setting a case
for "trial." But to this uneducated and inexperienced
defendant, a setting for "hearing" was not a clear
notice that the defendant had to be ready for trial on
that date. . . .
[W]e have also cautioned that "because of his lack of
technical knowledge of law and procedure [a layman
acting as his own attorney] should be accorded every
consideration that may reasonably be indulged." . . .
The deficiency in this case concerns what happened
before the trial. The vulnerability of a layman who is
unrepresented as he approaches a trial of the legal and
factual complexity of this case requires more judicial
consideration than was extended here. Most
importantly, defendant was not clearly informed of the
date of trial until two days before it was to begin.
That deficiency jeopardized one of the most important
ingredients of due process: time to prepare a defense.
Id. at 1213.
In this case, SMP was represented by counsel who fully briefed
the issues before the trial court on summary judgment, requested
oral argument on the Motion and argued against the Motion at the
hearing. SMP was not denied the "opportunity to present
objections" or be heard in its opposition to the Motion.

decision as to whether, upon the whole course of proceedings and
in all the attending circumstances, there was a denial of
fundamental fairness," which is "a question of judgment and
degree."

Munoz v. Maschner, 590 P.2d 1352, 1355 (Wyo. 1979)

(emphasis supplied).
Fair and adequate notice under due process analysis does not
necessarily mean notice of a hearing, as suggested by SMP; rather
the concept of fair notice means being apprised of the
claims/allegations/charges against a party and having a fair and
meaningful opportunity to be heard in response, based on the
particular circumstances of the case.

Courts recognize that an

oral hearing, where the parties have submitted information to the
judge or court, is not a right under the due process clause
because the person was afforded a fair and reasonable opportunity
to be heard on the issues, albeit in writing.

For example in

United Nuclear Corp. v. General Atomic Co., 93 N.M. 105, 597 P.2d
290 (1979), the court stated:
GAC claims that the failure to accord it a hearing was
a violation of its due process rights. The
requirements of due process are not technical, and no
particular form of procedure is necessary for
protecting substantive rights. Mitchell v. W.T. Grant
Co., 416 U.S. 600 (1974). The circumstances of the
case dictate the requirements. . . . The integrity of
the fact-finding process and the basic fairness of the
decision are the principal considerations. . . . Oral
argument on a motion is not a due process right. . , .
The parties had full opportunity to brief the facts and
the law, and they filed extensive briefs with the court
before this decision. Both sides filed requested
findings of fact and conclusions of law.
597 P.2d at 308-09 (emphasis supplied) (citations omitted).

Similarly, in Jones v. Nuclear Pharmacy, Inc., 741 F.2d 322
(10th Cir. 1984), the Court stated:
Appellant was afforded the full panoply of procedural
due process when he received adequate notice of the
settlement hearing and had the significant opportunity
to be heard by submitting an extensive memorandum to
the court prior to the hearing detailing his objection
to the settlement. The failure to conduct an
evidentiary hearing when all parties concerned with the
settlement had notice of the settlement hearing, the
opportunity to be heard, and access to the fruits of
detailed discovery, is not a violation of due process.
Id. at 325 (emphasis supplied).

See also Monumental Health Plan

v. Department of Health, 510 F. Supp. 244, 248 (D. Md. 1981)
("The major thrust of Monumentalfs due process hearing argument
is that it should have been granted an oral hearing before the
agency took action on its qualification or its loan installment.
The Court finds this argument to be unpersuasive.

Simply because

a party was not afforded an oral hearing does not necessarily
mean he has been denied due process"); Newsome v. Vanderbilt
University, 453 F. Supp. 401, 424 (M.D. Tenn. 1978) ("At the core
of due process is of course a requirement that individuals be
given an effective opportunity to present affirmative evidence
and to refute adverse evidence, though not necessarily at an oral
hearing") (emphasis supplied) (citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424
U.S. 319, 348, 349 (1976)).

Faulty notice of an oral hearing on

the Motion could not offend constitutional notions of fairness if
a procedural due process right to an oral hearing does not exist
—especially where the responding party has notice of the Motion
and opportunity to object and oppose it in writing, as here.
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The

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and the Code of Judicial
Administration, through the briefing process afforded SMP,
provided such fair and meaningful opportunity for SMP to object
and be heard fully on the issues raised in the Summary Judgment
Motion.
Based on the foregoing, the question is whether SMP was
denied a fair and reasonable opportunity to be heard on the
issues raised in the Motion for Summary Judgment.

SMP received

notice of AJ/Reyco's Motion for Summary Judgment and responded
thereto, in writing, with a Memorandum in Opposition filed with
and considered by the trial court.

Thereafter, SMP also filed an

Affidavit in opposition to the Motion.

After AJ/Reyco filed

their reply, SMP requested oral argument on the Motion—
presumably when SMP had completed its briefing.

The trial court,

through inadvertence, sent notice of a hearing on an Ex Parte
Application to File Overlength Memorandum.

However, trial courts

as a matter of course grant such applications without hearing,
something SMP!s counsel knew or reasonably should have known. At
the hearing, SMP!s counsel appeared, argued and opposed the
Motion for Summary Judgment, and the trial court took the Motion
under advisement.

The Record is silent with respect to any

objection to the form of notice, or any request for additional
time to prepare written or oral argument in opposition to the
Motion.

Because SMP was afforded a fair and reasonable

opportunity to oppose the Motion and be heard, both orally and in

writing, in its opposition thereto, SMP was not denied procedural
due process.
POINT IV
THE RECORD CONTAINS NO FACTS TO SUPPORT A PRIMA FACIE
CASE AGAINST AJ/REYCO UNDER ANY OF SMPfS THEORIES
In Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 2552 (1986),
cited with approval in Robinson v. Intermountain Health Care, 740
P.2d 262 (Utah App. 1987), the Court stated:
In our view, the plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates
the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for
discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to
make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of
an element essential to that party's case, and on which
that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. In
such a situation, there can be "no genuine issue as to
any material fact" since a complete failure of proof
concerning an essential element of the non-moving
party's case necessarily renders all other facts
immaterial. The moving party is "entitled to judgment
as a matter of law" because the non-moving party has
failed to make a sufficient showing on an essential
element of her case with respect to which she has the
burden of proof. "[T]h[e] standard [for granting
summary judgment] mirrors the standard for a directed
verdict under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(a)
(Emphasis supplied.)
SMP has no evidence that the suspension assemblies were
defective or that any alleged defect in them was the proximate
cause of the cracking in the trailers.

Even assuming SMP had

shown a connection between Thaycofs failure to install the cross
pipe brace and the cracking in the trailers, Reyco provided the
proper installation instructions to Thayco, satisfying its duty.
See infra, POINT V.

SMP's claims and factual assertions against

AJ/Reyco are based in speculation and conjecture and not in any
20

evidence in the Record.

The "plaintiff must present sufficient

evidence to establish a prima facie case against the defendant in
order to have his cause submitted for consideration by the jury."
Lindsay v. Gibbons and Reed, 27 Utah 2d 419, 497 P.2d 28, 30
(1972).

A prima facie case requires that each element of the

cause of action be based in "substantial evidence":

"Absent

substantial evidence of any proof of negligence or cause, 'an
inference of both amounts to nothing more than impermissible
speculation and conjecture.1"9

Gregory v. Fourthwest

Investments, Ltd., 754 P.2d 89, 92 (Utah App. 1988) (citation
omitted).

Where SMPfs evidence, at best, does not establish any

one or more elements of its claims as more likely than not,
plaintiff has failed to meet the threshold requirement.

See,

e.g., Mitchell v. Pearson Enterprises, 697 P.2d 240 (Utah 1985).
SMP fails its burden with respect to every element of its claims
against AJ/Reyco because its entire case, after discovery and

9

This Court defines "substantial evidence" as "evidence
. , . which furnishes a substantial basis of fact from which the
issues tendered can reasonably be resolved." Gregory, 754 P.2d
at 92 n.2 (citation omitted).

opportunity for discovery,10 still is based in unsubstantiated,
conclusory allegations.1X
Without evidence to show that AJ/Reyco failed to exercise
reasonable care with respect to SMP, that their product was
flawed or unreasonably dangerous, or that their product was the
proximate cause of SMP's property damage, SMP's claims against
Respondents AJ/Reyco fail for lack of evidence.
POINT V
SMP STATES NO COGNIZABLE CLAIM FOR PRODUCT
DEFECT BASED ON THE INSTALLATION INSTRUCTIONS
The facts are undisputed that Thayco, by and through its
purchasing agent, obtained the necessary drawings and
instructions for proper installation of the suspension

10

SMP asserts that the Order of Summary Judgment was
inappropriate because the Order was entered before SMP had
opportunity to conduct its discovery. Appellant's Brief at 10.
The merits of that assertion are suspect because (1) the
Complaint was filed two years before the Order was entered,
giving SMP sufficient time to conduct discovery, (2) AJ/Reyco did
nothing to inhibit SMP's discovery efforts, (3) discovery was in
fact conducted by SMP, see R. at 84, 87, 90, 95, 255, 256 and 257
(Depositions of Thayer, Crough, Faires, Docherty and Metcalt, at
which SMPfs counsel was in attendance and asked questions), (4)
no discovery was filed or sought by SMP after AJ/Reyco filed
their Motion for Summary Judgment, and (5) SMP did not file a
motion or Rule 56(f) Affidavit seeking more time in which to
respond to the Motion for Summary Judgment or to conduct
discovery.
ia

-AJ/Reyco do not dispute the authority cited in SMP!s Brief
that negligence cases generally present fact questions that
cannot be resolved summarily by the court. However, those cases
presuppose the existence of sufficient evidence to raise a fact
question going to the matter asserted, e.g., negligence, breach,
proximate cause, defective product, etc. SMP's case does not
rise to that level because the evidence, as a matter of law, is
insufficient to state a prima facie case.
22

assemblies.

It is undisputed that Mr. Crough did receive these

instructions when he began assembling the suspensions.12

It is

undisputed that Thayco failed to follow the instructions for two
reasons:

(1) the engineer for Thayco had instructed Mr. Crough

that a cross pipe brace was unnecessary; and (2) the Watkins1
instructions Thayco used did not call for a cross pipe brace.
SMP has admitted that had Thayco followed the instructions, no
loss would have occurred.13

Now, in conclusory form, SMP

contends that Reyco's instructions to Thayco1* or method of
instructing Thayco were inadequate.

However, this argument fails

because (1) no evidence in the Record supports the allegation,
(2) an instruction cannot be considered defective or unsafe if it
was not read or heeded and (3) a component part supplier exhausts
its duty by providing instructions to the manufacturer.

X2

Even assuming that Mr. Crough had not obtained the
installation instructions, as alleged by SMP, the facts are
undisputed that Mr. Docherty, SMPfs purchasing agent with whom
Thayco was dealing, received the instructions. Mr. Docherty did
not think it important to pass along the instructions to Mr.
Crough because he thought Mr. Crough knew what he was doing and
did not need them. (R. at 90 (Docherty, pp, 16, 29).) Agency
law imputes the knowledge of an agent to the principal, whether
or not the agent informs the principal. Xanthos v. Board of
Adjustment of Salt Lake City, 685 P.2d 1032 (Utah 1984); FMA
Financial Corp. v. Hansen Dairy, Inc., 617 P.2d 327 (Utah 1980).
Reyco satisfied its duty by giving installation instructions to
the person whom Thayco had designated as its purchasing agent
—Mr. Docherty.
13
x

See supra, footnote 2.

*As discussed under POINT I above, the alleged inadequacy
of the instructions is raised for the first time on appeal.

SMPfs contention suggests that a component part supplier has
a duty to make certain that the manufacturer who incorporates the
component must do so properly and in accordance with the
suppliers instructions.

The law does not, for good reason,

extend one's duty to that extreme,

A seller who gives a product

instruction or warning may reasonably assume that it will be read
and heeded.

Schmeiser v. Trus Joist Corp., 273 Or. 120, 540 P.2d

998 (1975).

A component supplier exhausts its duty by providing

instructions to the manufacturer for safe and proper installation
of the component.

Where the manufacturer does not heed the

instructions, no liability attaches to the component-supplier.
See, e.g., Eyster v. Borg-Warner Corp., 131 Ga. App. 702, 206
S.E.2d 668 (1974) ("instructions specifically directed the use of
copper wire [and that] the unit should be installed in accordance
with national and electrical codes"; manufacturer's failure to
follow instructions did not establish liability on the component
supplier); Amatulli v. Delhi Constr. Corp., 548 N.Y.S. 2d 774
(A.D. 1989) ("Under the circumstances, the defects alleged are
insufficient, as a matter of law, to raise a factual issue
regarding Seasprayfs liability.
the manufacturer's plant.

The pool was safe when it left

If it had been installed in accordance

with the manufacturer's specifications, . . . the depth of the
pool would have been obvious. . . . The law imposes no further
obligation on the part of the manufacturer to enforce its clear
instructions . . . " ) .

A supplier fulfills its duty when it gives

adequate warning or instruction to the intermediate buyer which
24

is a large industrial concern with its own programs and methods
of distribution and where the supplier has no effective means to
communicate instructions or warnings to the ultimate users.

Reed

v. Pennwalt Corp., 22 Wash. App. 719, 591 P.2d 478 (1970).
Indeed, a manufacturer reasonably relies on a learned middleman,
who is to incorporate the component into its own product, where
the middleman is knowledgeable and experienced.

Manning v.

Ashland Oil Co., 721 F.2d 192 (7th Cir. 1983).
Mr. Crough!s failure to use the drawings is something over
which AJ/Reyco had no control and no right of control.

Reyco

could not force or require compliance with its instructions and
drawings.

Reycofs duty was reasonably exhausted when it supplied

the proper and safe installations instructions and drawings to
Thayco.
VI. CONCLUSION
For these reasons the trial court's Order for Summary
Judgment should be affirmed.
DATED this iS^

day of

CK*AJL^

, 1990.

SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & hJA£IXM£AU
By
Raymond M. Bfcrry
Richard A. Van Wagoner
Attorneys for Defendants/
Respondents Reyco Industries,
Inc., and AJ Industries, Inc.
35\rav\11329.012\bn"ef
A:\bHef
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ADDENDUM A

FILED !N _.
4TH DISTRICT COURT
STATE OF UTAH

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

SMP, INC.,

MINUTE ENTRY

Plaintiff,

CASE NUMBER:

CV-87-2238

vs.

DATE:

THAYCO MANUFACTURING INC. et al,

CULLEN Y. CHRISTENSEN, JUDGE

Defendant.

Rept.:

August 18, 1989

E.V. Quist, CSR

UNDER ADVISEMENT
This was the time set for hearing Def Reyco and
A.J.Industries Motion for Summary Judgment. Joseph Nemelka
appeared as counsel for the plaintiff, Raymond M. Berry as
counsel for Reyco Industries, Inc. and AJ Industries Inc. and Don
R. Petersen as counsel for Def Thayco Manufacturing.
Mr. Berry addressed the Court and argued his Motion for
Summary Juidgment. Counsel requested the depositions of James F.
Crough and Lynn Docherty be published at this time.
The Court granted the request and depositions allowed
published.
Mr. Nemelka objected to the Summary Judgment Motion and
argued same.
Rebuttal argument made.
Mr. Petersen stated he has not joined in the Motion for
Summary Judgment and has nothing to add.
The Court took the matter under advisement.

ADDENDUM B

FILED IN
4™ DISTRICT COURT

STAT£ C- UTAH
$E? i'i
DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY,

3 ?9 fif '39

STATE OF UTAH

SMP, Inc.,
Plaintiff,
Case No. CV-87-2238
vs.

RULING

THAYCO MANUFACTURING, INC.,
et al.,
Defendants.

This matter comes before the Court, under Rule
4-501, on the motion of defendants Reyco Industries., Inc. and
AJ Industries, Inc. seeking summary judgment.

The Court has

reviewed the file, considered the memoranda of counsel,
entertained argument of counsel, and upon being advised in
the premises, now makes the following:
FINDINGS
The Court finds that the following material facts
are not disputed:
1. Lynn Docherty was the purchasing agent for
Thayco Manufacturing, Inc., (hereinafter "Thayco") and was
responsible for purchasing the suspension assembly kits for
the Thayco trailer manufacturing concern in South Hill,
Virginia.
2.

James F. Crough worked for Thayco in South

-2-

Hill, Virginia as plant manager beginning in 1984 when
Thayco purchased a trailer manufacturing concern from
Watkins Manufacturing, (hereinafter "Watkins11).
3. Mr. Crough was in charge of the manufacture
and assembly of trailers for Thayco at the time when Thayco
manufactured trailers that were eventually sold to the
plaintiff.
4. When Thayco manufactured the trailers that
eventually were sold to the plaintiff, Mr. Crough and Thayco
simply used drawings and instructions obtained from Watkins
when Thayco purchased the business because Thayco made no
design changes in the trailers.
5.

Thayco manufactured the trailers without including

crosspipe braces in the suspension assemblies because the
Watkins instructions and drawings did not call for the crosspipe and because Mr. Kinkle, a Thayco engineer, had told
Messrs. Crough and Docherty that they were not necessary.
6.

Reyco supplied to Thayco by and through Thaycofs

purchasing agent Lynn Docherty, installation instructions and
drawings for the Thayco suspension assemblies.

In addition,

Mr. Crough had in his possession prior to any assembly of
the Reyco kit into the subject trailers a copy of the Reyco
sales manual which indicated the necessity of installing
crosspipes and reinforcement plates as part of the assembly
process.
7.

The installation instructions and drawings

-3-

for the suspension assemblies instruct the assembler to use
crosspipe braces in the installation.
8. When Thayco manufactured the trailers in
question, Mr. Crough had not received the Reyco suspension
assembly and instructions from Mr. Docherty.
9.

Thayco's purchasing agent, Mr. Docherty, did not

discuss the installation of the Reyco suspension systems with
Mr. Crough because he assumed that Mr. Crough was familiar
with the correct procedures for installation of such suspension
systems.
10.

Thaycofs purchasing agent, Mr. Docherty, the

person who received from Reyco the installation instructions
and drawings that specified the need for a crosspipe brace,
never discussed with Mr. Crough the fact that Reyco instructions and drawings specified the use of crosspipe bracing
for the Reyco suspension assemblies.
11.

Mr. Docherty, who failed to pass on the

instructions to Mr. Crough, assumed that Mr. Crough had
crosspipe bracing available to him in South Hill, Virginia.
12.

The crosspipe bracing could be purchased locally

at South Hill, Virginia, at less expense to Thayco than it
could be by purchasing it from Reyco; that as a matter of
industry practice, suspension manufacturers do not sell nor
include pipe bracing
13.

with their suspension system kits.

Thayco never provided Reyco with drawings of

20
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how it was going to install the suspension assemblies and
of the particular design of its trailers, so Reyco was unaware
of the size of scabplate and crosspipe needed for assembly
in the Thayco trailers.
14.

On two occasions, Bob Wells, an employee of

Reyco, visited the Thayco facility in South Hill and met with
Mr. Crough.

Mr. Crough could not testify whether Mr. Wells

observed any of the trailers that Thayco had manufactured,
and he could not recall what he and Mr. Wells had looked at.
However, all deliveries of trailers had been made to SMP
before the second visit.
15.

That said defendants did not design, manufacture,

sell or distribute the trailers in question, but: only supplied
a component part, suspension assemblies.
16.

That the plaintiff admits that the lack of

installation of a crosspipe brace in the said suspension
assemblies by Thayco was a proximate cause of plaintifffs
damage and that had Thayco properly installed the suspension
assemblies with crosspipe braces, said suspension assemblies
furnished by defendants Reyco and AJ Industries would not
have been a proximate cause of plaintiff's property damage.
CONCLUSIONS
Based upon the foregoing the Court concludes as
follows:
1.

That as a matter of law, said defendants are

-5-

entitled to summary judgment in their favor.
The only potential issue of disputed fact arises
by reason of plaintiff's assertion that an agent of said
defendants, while at the Thayco plant, and after observing
what was being done, said "everything is all right.11 However,
plaintiff's witness could not say whether the defendants'
agent actually looked at any trailers which had -been manufactured or what it was that said agent saw.

Such an assertion

is not, in the opinion of the Court, sufficient to raise a
genuine issue of fact. What the agent actually saw or to
what he was referring when such statement was made can only
be mere speculation and as such could not form any basis
upon which the trier of fact ought to be permitted to base
a judgment.
Plaintiff also contends that since, in its view,
said defendants changed the design of their spring hanger
assembly after Thayco had installed the defendants' assemblies
in the trailer which plaintiff ultimately purchased, such
alleged action creates a genuine issue of material fact of
negligent design.

The Court does not believe that such

action by said defendants, if true, would give rise to the
result for which plaintiffs contend and the Court adopts the
argument of the defendants in this regard as follows:
"First, Rule 56, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and
common sense require that evidence supporting or opposing
summary judgment be admissible in evidence.

Rule 407, Utah
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Rules of Evidence, precludes the admissibility of subsequent
remedial measures fto prove negligence or culpable conduct
in connection with the event.1

Where such evidence is

inadmissible for the very purpose for which plaintiff makes
the assertion, it cannot be used on summary judgment to create
a fact issue.
"Second, and more significantly, the plaintiff admits in
its fact paragraph 10 that the lack of the crosspipe brace
was a proximate cause of plaintiff's property damage.
Plaintiff!s implicit admission is that had the crosspipe
braces been properly installed according to the Reyco instructions and drawings, there would have been no problem, at least
none caused by the Reyco product.

Plaintifffs post hoc

contention of subsequent remedial measures to show negligence
or fault has no place where the supplied product was safe
if used according to the instructions and drawings that
accompanied it.11
ORDER
1.

Counsel for said defendants is directed to

prepare and serve an appropriate summary judgment in their
favor consistent with the foregoing.
Dated this

/<-/

day of September 1989.

BY THE COURT:

ADDENDUM C

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

SMP INC.,
Plaintiff,
vs.

CASE NUMBER:

CV 87 2238

RULING

THAYCO MANUFACTURING INC. et al,
Defendants.

This matter comes before the Court, under Rule 4-501,
on the objections of Pi to the form of the proposed Summary
Judgment in favor of Defs Aj Industries Inc and Reyco Industries
Inc submitted pursuant to the Ruling of the Court filed Sept 14,
1989. The Court has reviewed the file, considered the memoranda
of counsel, and upon being advised in the premises, now makes the
following:
RULING
1. Said objections are overruled and the proposed
Summary Judgment heretofore submitted by counsel for said Defs
has been signed this date.
Dated this /h
day of October, 1989.
BY THE COURT:

^z:
;ULLEN~Y^CHRISTENSEN, JUDGE
cc:

Joseph N. Nemelka Jr., Esq.
Raymond M. Berry, Esq.
Don R. Petersen, Esq.
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RAYMOND M. BERRY - A0310
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
Attorneys for Defendants Reyco
Industries and AJ Industries
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor
Post Office Box 45000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Telephone: (801) 521-9000

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
SMP, INC., a corporation,
Plaintiff,
vs.
THAYCO MANUFACTURING, INC., a
corporation; FLEET SALES AND
LEASING COMPANY, a corporation; AJ INDUSTRIES, INC., a
corporation; REYCO INDUSTRIES,
INC., a corporation; and ERIE
WHEELS DIVISION OF ERIE
MALLEABLE IRON COMPANY, a
corporation,
Defendants.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF
AJ INDUSTRIES, INC. AND REYCO
INDUSTRIES, INC.

Civil No. CV87-2238

Judge Cullen Y. Christensen

The Motion of Defendants Reyco Industries, Inc. and AJ
Industries, Inc. for Summary Judgment in their favor that Plaintiff take nothing from them came on for hearing before the aboveentitled Court on Friday, August 18, 1989, Honorable Cullen Y.
Christensen, District Judge, presiding, Joseph N. Nemelka, Jr.
appearing for Plaintiff SMP, Inc., Raymond M. Berry appearing for
Defendants Reyco Industries, Inc. and AJ Industries, Inc., the

depositions of Lynn Docherty and James Crough having been
published, the issues having been briefed by counsel for the
respective parties, the arguments of counsel having been heard
and the Court having been duly advised in the premises and made
Findings and Fact and Conclusions of Law ruling that there is no
genuine issue of any material pact and that the facts that were
material were not disputed as set forth in the Court's Ruling of
September 14, 1989,
NOW, THEREFORE, it is ordered and adjudged that SMP,
Inc. take nothing from Reyco Industries, Inc. and AJ Industries,
Inc. and that plaintiff's action against them be dismissed on the
merits with prejudice and that Defendants Reyco Industries, Inc.
and AJ Industries, Inc. recover from the Plaintiff SMP, Inc.
their costs of action.
DATED this

t?

day of
BY THE COURT:
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. 1989.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I do hereby certify that on the 25th day of June, 1990, and
caused four (4) true and correct copies of the Brief of
Defendants/ Respondents Reyco Industries, Inc. and AJ Industries,
Inc. to be served upon the following:
Joseph N. Nemelka, Jr.
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant
7001 South 900 East, Suite 210A
Midvale, UT 84047

Richard A. Van Wagoner

